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Abtract : 
 
This paper examines the algebraic cryptanalysis of small scale variants of the LEX-BES.  LEX-BES is a stream cipher based on 
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block cipher. LEX is a generic method proposed for constructing a stream cipher from a 
block cipher, initially introduced by Biryukov at eSTREAM, the ECRYPT Stream Cipher project in 2005. The Big Encryption 
System (BES) is a block cipher introduced at CRYPTO 2002 which facilitates the algebraic analysis of the AES block cipher. In 
this paper, experiments were conducted to find solution of the equation system describing small scale LEX-BES using Gröbner 
Basis computations. This follows a similar approach to the work by Cid, Murphy and Robshaw at FSE 2005 that investigated 
algebraic cryptanalysis on small scale variants of the BES. The difference between LEX-BES and BES is that due to the way the 
keystream is extracted, the number of unknowns in LEX-BES equations is fewer than the number in BES. As far as the author 
knows, this attempt is the first at creating solvable equation systems for stream ciphers based on the LEX method using Gröbner 
Basis computations. 
 
Introduction 
 
LEX is a generic method proposed for constructing a stream cipher from a block cipher. It was initially 
introduced by Biryukov in 2005 (Biryukov, 2005; Biryukov, 2007). The basic idea of LEX is to use a block 
cipher as a keystream generator for a binary additive stream cipher. The keystream is produced by 
extracting part of the internal state at specific rounds. In the LEX proposal, an example of using this 
method is given where the AES (Daemen and Rijmen, 2002) is selected as the block cipher. In the 
remainder of this paper, the term LEX-AES is used to refer to this specific instance based on the AES with 
a 128-bit key. 
 
There are two versions of LEX-AES. The first version (Biryukov, 2005) was susceptible to a slide attack. 
The attack enabled a particular key to be recovered if used with about 261  random IVs where each IV 
produces 20,000 bytes of keystream (Wu and Preneel, 2006). The second version of LEX-AES (Biryukov, 
2007) was subjected to a key recovery attack by Dunkelman and Keller (2008) which requires 236.3 bytes 
of keystream and 2112  operations. They note that their attack can also be applied to the first version of 
LEX-AES. 
 
The Big Encryption System (BES) is a block cipher modeled according to the AES (Murphy and Robshaw, 
2002). It was designed to facilitate the algebraic analysis of the AES. In this paper, the term LEX-BES 
refers to an example of using the BES in the generic LEX technique.  
 
One of the motivations for exploring algebraic relations in LEX-BES is because it inherits the rich 
algebraic structure of the AES. In particular, the AES has been described as a system of continued fractions 
over 𝐺𝐹(28) (Ferguson, Schroeppel and Whiting, 2001). It has also been studied under the so-called XSL 
attack using a system of equations over GF(2) (Courtois and Pieprzyk, 2002). Simple multivariate quadratic 
equations over 𝐺𝐹(28) can be derived by embedding the AES in the larger cipher called the Big Encryption 
System (BES) (Murphy and Robshaw, 2002). Furthermore, the amount of data required in algebraic attacks 
is usually much smaller than conventional statistical attacks. It is therefore natural to study LEX-BES from 
the perspective of algebraic attacks. 
 
This paper presents the results of the algebraic analysis of LEX-BES. The analysis involves forming a 
system of equations that links the keystream, internal state and secret key bytes. A known plaintext attack is 
assumed, so the attacker has access to a sequence of known plaintext and the corresponding keystream. 
This paper is organized as follows. The first section describes the LEX-BES stream cipher. The small scale 
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variants of LEX-BES are given in the second section. The third section presents the result and discussion of 
the algebraic analysis of LEX-BES.  
 
Description of LEX-BES 
 
LEX-BES has an internal state of 32 bytes, composed of a 16-byte state block 𝐱 and a 16-byte secret key 
block 𝐤. The reader is referred to Murphy and Robshaw (2002) for a more detailed treatment of BES. 
 
Initialization 
 
The 128-byte secret key 𝐤 is expanded by the key scheduling algorithm to produce eleven 128-byte round 
subkeys, denoted 𝐤0,𝐤1,… ,𝐤10 . All 11 round subkeys are used in the initialization process but only 10 
round subkeys are used by the state update function during keystream generation. Let 𝐱𝑡  denote the internal 
state at iteration 𝑡. The internal state is initialized by encrypting a 128-byte IV with 𝐤 using the full 10-
round BES. The output of the initialization phase is denoted by 𝐱0. 
 
Keystream Generation 
 
The 128-byte internal state 𝐱𝑡 = (𝑥𝑡 0,0 ,… , 𝑥𝑡 0,7 , 𝑥𝑡 1,0 ,… , 𝑥𝑡 15,7 ) is updated in iteration 𝑡 using the 
round function of LEX-BES. The 𝑇 iterations of the keystream generator of LEX-BES can be described as 
follows: 
 
In every iteration, after the state is updated, 4 × 4 = 32 bytes of 𝐱𝑡  are extracted directly by the output 
function 𝑓 to form the keystream. The extracted bytes are 
𝑓 𝐱𝑡 =  
 𝐱𝑡 0 , 𝐱𝑡 2 , 𝐱𝑡 8 , 𝐱𝑡 10  ,
 𝐱𝑡 4 , 𝐱𝑡 6 , 𝐱𝑡 12 , 𝐱𝑡 14  ,
  
if 𝑡 is odd
if 𝑡 is even
 
where 𝐱𝑡(𝑖) = (𝑥𝑡 𝑖 ,0 , 𝑥𝑡 𝑖 ,1 ,… , 𝑥𝑡(𝑖 ,7)), and 𝑥𝑡(𝑖 ,𝑗 ) = 𝑥𝑡(𝑖 ,𝑗−1)
2  for 𝑗 = 1,2,… ,7.  
 
Equation System for LEX-BES 
 
Let the vector 𝐱𝑡  denote the inverse of the vector 𝐰𝑡  at iteration 𝑡, that is, 𝐱𝑡 = 𝐰𝑡
−1. Let 𝑥𝑡(𝑖 ,𝑗 ), 𝑤𝑡(𝑖 ,𝑗 ) and 
𝑘𝑡(𝑖 ,𝑗 ) denote the (8𝑖 + 𝑗)-th component of the vectors 𝐱𝑡 , 𝐰𝑡  and 𝐤𝑡 , respectively. The following system of 
equations describes 𝑇 iterations of LEX-BES: 
  0 = 𝑥𝑡(𝑖 ,𝑗 )𝑤𝑡 𝑖 ,𝑗  + 1 𝑡 = 0,1,… ,𝑇 (1) 
  0 =  𝑤𝑡 𝑖 ,𝑗  + 𝑘𝑡 mod 10 𝑖 ,𝑗  +  𝛼 𝑖 ,𝑗 ′  𝑥𝑡−1 𝑘 ′ ,𝑚 ′   𝑡 = 1,2,… ,𝑇 (2) 
  0 = 𝑥𝑡 𝑖 ,𝑗  
2 + 𝑥𝑡 𝑖 ,𝑗+1  𝑡 = 1,2,… ,𝑇 (3) 
  0 = 𝑤𝑡(𝑖 ,𝑗 )
2 + 𝑤𝑡(𝑖 ,𝑗+1) 𝑡 = 1,2,… ,𝑇 (4) 
 
 
where the 𝑤0(𝑖 ,𝑗 ) are the input vector components for the first iteration of LEX-BES (the output of the 
initialization phase), and the 𝛼(𝑖 ,𝑗 ′) represent the elements of the linear diffusion matrix of LEX-BES. The 
above system of equations is assumed to have no zero inversion. In other words, the vector components 
𝑥𝑡(𝑖 ,𝑗 ), 𝑤𝑡(𝑖 ,𝑗 ) and 𝑘𝑡(𝑖 ,𝑗 ) are assumed to be nonzero. 
 
In the algebraic analysis of small scale variants of LEX-BES in this paper, it is assumed that the keystream 
bytes are known. In LEX-BES, the round subkey used in the first iteration is 𝐤1 and the value of 𝐰0 is 
unknown. For simplicity in writing the equations, the iteration will be started where the round subkey used 
is 𝐤0. Therefore, the number of encryption equations for 10 iterations is 10 × 8 ×   16 + 3 × 12 =
 4106 in 8 × 12 ×  10 × 2 + 1 =  2016 state and 10 × 8 × 16 = 1280 key variables. The system 
includes 10 × 8 × 3 × 12 = 2880 quadratic and 1280 linear equations. Since only 10 round subkeys are 
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used in LEX-BES, the key schedule can be written using 3008 equations in 1280 basic and 288 auxiliary 
key variables. As mentioned earlier, 32 bytes of keystream are extracted by the output function in every 
iteration. Therefore, the amount of keystream required to generate these equations are 32 × 10 = 320 
bytes. 
 
More equations can be generated if further keystream bytes are known. Recall that only 10 of the round 
subkeys are used during keystream generation, and each particular round subkey is reused 10 rounds later. 
If consecutive 10-round blocks are used, then each repetition will add 416 × 10 = 4160 equations and 
192 ×  10 = 1920 variables. The number of key schedule equations and round subkey variables remain 
unchanged because the same subkeys are used in every 10-th round. If more than one 10-round block is 
used, then the blocks are assumed consecutive. 
 
In comparison, the BES encryption can be written as a system of 5248 equations over 𝐺𝐹(28), of which 
3840 are quadratic and the remaining 1408 are linear equations (Murphy and Robshaw, 2002). There are 
2560 state variables and 1408 key variables in this system. In addition, the key schedule can be described 
using a similar system comprising 3328 equations in 1408 basic and 320 auxiliary key variables. Therefore, 
the number of equations and variables arising from LEX-BES is less than for BES. 
 
Small Scale LEX-BES 
 
This section briefly describes the small scale LEX-BES which is based on the small scale AES proposed by 
Cid, Murphy and Robshaw (2005). Several small scale variants of LEX-BES are used in the experiments 
presented later in this paper. 
 
The small scale LEX-BES parameters are given by 𝑛𝑅 ,𝑛𝑤 ,𝑛𝑐 ,𝑛𝑏 . The parameter 𝑛𝑅 denotes the number of 
BES rounds used in LEX-BES. The parameters 𝑛𝑤  and 𝑛𝑐  denote the number of rows and columns, 
respectively in the AES state matrix. Note that the AES state matrix has four rows and four columns. The 
parameter 𝑛𝑏  denotes both the size of each element in the AES state matrix and the number of components 
of a single LEX-BES vector. Let 𝐿𝐵(𝑛𝑅 ,𝑛𝑤 ,𝑛𝑐 ,𝑛𝑏) denote a specific instance of a small scale LEX-BES. 
In this paper, the focus is on the 𝐿𝐵(𝑛𝑅 , 2,2,4) variant where four bytes are extracted by the output function 
in each iteration to form the keystream. 
 
Equation System for Small Scale LEX-BES 
 
The system of equations for small scale LEX-BES is very similar to those given for the full scale LEX-
BES. In fact, the equation system for the full scale LEX-BES corresponds to the 𝐿𝐵(10,4,4,8) variant. As 
an example, the number of equations and variables for the small scale variant 𝐿𝐵(10,2,2,4) are shown in 
Table 1. For instance, the entries for 𝑡 = 11 denote the total number of equations and variables that exist in 
the first 11 iterations. In the first 10 iterations, the number of variables in each iteration is increased by 48 
from the previous iteration. However, the number of variables increased only by 24 when 𝑡 > 10 since the 
number of round subkey variables remains unchanged. The amount of keystream required to generate the 
equations is 4𝑡 bytes. 
   
Iteration 
(t) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Equations 68 168 268 368 468 568 668 768 868 968 
Variables 52 100 148 196 244 292 340 388 436 484 
Iteration 
(t) 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Equations 1020 1072 1124 1176 1228 1280 1332 1384 1436 1488 
Variables 508 532 556 580 604 628 652 676 700 724 
 
Table 1:   Number of equations and variables for 𝐿𝐵(10,2,2,4) 
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Compared to LEX-BES (and its small scale variants), the total number of equations arising from BES is 
always twice as many as the number of variables. An example is shown in Table 2 for a small scale BES 
defined over 𝐺𝐹(24) where both the number rows and columns of its state matrix is four. In LEX-BES, for 
𝑡 > 10, as the number of iterations increases, the number of equations will also gradually increase more 
than the increase in variables. 
 
Experimental Results 
 
This section presents experimental results which relate to the solution of the equation system describing 
small scale LEX-BES. The experiments show the time required to find the solution for the equations using 
Gröbner basis computations. The reader is referred to Becker and Weispfenning (1993) for a more detailed 
treatment of Gröbner basis.. The computations were performed using the MAGMA 2.14-11 computational 
algebra package (Bosma, Cannon and Playoust, 1997). The experiments were implemented on a 64-bit 1.6 
GHz Itanium 2 processor computer with 198 GB of RAM, running on SUSE Linux operating system.  
 
Rounds 
(nR) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Equations 144 256 368 480 592 704 816 928 1040 1152 
Variables 72 128 184 240 296 352 408 464 520 576 
 
Table 2:   Number of equations and variables for small scale BES defined over GF(2
4
) 
 
The experiments were conducted as follows. Firstly, the system of polynomial equations consisting of the 
small scale LEX-BES keystream generation and key scheduling algorithm were written. Then, the 
corresponding polynomial ideal generated from the polynomials in the system was computed using 
Magma. Lastly, the Gröbner basis of the related polynomial ideal was computed. If a unique solution was 
found, Gröbner basis immediately gives the solution to the original system. Since the equations of the form 
𝑥𝑤 =  1 are invalid when 𝑥 =  𝑤 =  0, the experiments were configured so that no zero-inversion occurs 
in the system. 
 
Iterations Equations Variables Time Memory Amount of 
keystream 
1 68 52 0.03 7.5 4 
2 120 76 n/a n/a 8 
 
Table 3:   Time (in seconds) and memory (in MB) required to compute Gröbner basis for the equation 
system arising from 𝐿𝐵(1,2,2,4) 
 
Table 3 gives the time and memory requirements for finding solutions for the equation system arising from 
𝐿𝐵(1,2,2,4) using Gröbner basis computations. This variant uses the same subkey in every iteration of the 
update function. The time to compute the Gröbner basis for the equations in a single iteration is very fast, 
i.e., about 2 seconds, and the memory requirement is very small. However, by constructing the equations 
over 2 iterations, MAGMA failed to compute the Gröbner basis solution after 5 days of running time. Since 
the calculation is not done in a reasonable time, it is considered to be non-feasible. Note that for both sets 
of equations, the amounts of keystream required are very small. Only four bytes and eight bytes are 
required to generate the equations arising from one and two iterations, respectively. 
 
Table 4 shows the results of computing the Gröbner basis solution for the equation system arising from 
𝐿𝐵(10,2,2,4). The number of 10-round blocks denotes how many times the equations are repeated for the 
next consecutive 10-round block. For instance, if no 10-round block is used, then the equation system 
comprises only one iteration, say iteration 𝑖. If one 10-round block is used, then the equation system 
comprises the equations in iteration 𝑖 and iteration 𝑖 + 10. In the first row of Table 4, the system contains 
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68 equations in 52 variables. The 68 equations comprise of 12 equations each of the form given in Equation 
(1), Equation (3), and Equation (4) (3 ×  12 =  36 in total); 16 equations of the form given in Equation 
(2); and 16 equations of the form given in Equations (2) but for the key scheduling equations. The 52 
variables comprise of 3 ×  12 =  36 internal state variables (the variables 𝑥0(𝑖 ,𝑗 ), 𝑤0(𝑖 ,𝑗 ) and 𝑤1(𝑖 ,𝑗 )) and 16 
subkey variables (𝑘1(𝑖 ,𝑗 )). The addition of one 10-round block adds 52 new equations (the encryption 
equations only) and 36 new variables (the internal state). Note that the amounts of keystream required to 
generate the different sets of equations are very small. 
 
Number of 10-round blocks Equations Variables Time Memory Amount of 
keystream 
0 68 52 1.8 7.4 4 
1 120 88 4,497.6 727.89 44 
2 172 124 n/a n/a 84 
 
Table 4:   Time (in seconds) and memory (in MB) required to compute Gröbner basis for the equation 
system arising from 𝐿𝐵(10,2,2,4) 
 
The experiments failed to compute the Gröbner basis solution in reasonable time after 2 iterations, even for 
a small number of variables (less than 100). The experiments performed here were similar to those by Cid, 
Murphy and Robshaw (2005). Let 𝐴𝐸𝑆(𝑛𝑅 ,𝑛𝑤 ,𝑛𝑐 ,𝑛𝑏) denote a variant of a small scale AES with the same 
parameters as small scale LEX-BES.  In their results, they failed to compute the Gröbner basis for a system 
of equations arising from small scale 𝐴𝐸𝑆(2,2,2,4) and onwards. The results in this chapter seem to 
complement their work. Therefore, since it was not possible to get feasible results on small scale variants of 
LEX-BES, it is conjectured that the same experiments would most likely to fail on the full scale of LEX-
BES, which contains a system of thousands of equations and variables. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
The equation system arising from LEX-BES contains a set of 4160 equations in 3296 variables. If the key 
scheduling algorithm is taken into account, this will add another 3008 equations in 1568 variables. For 
small scale experiments, it is possible to compute the Gröbner basis solution for a very small number of 
equations and variables. However, even though the degree of the equations are not very high (quadratic), 
the same computation fails for a system of 120 equations and 76 variables over GF(2
4
). Therefore, 
extending the experiments from a small scale variant of LEX-BES to the full LEX-BES, which contains 
thousands of equations and variables over GF(2
8
), does not seem to be a feasible option.  
 
Despite this, algebraic cryptanalysis normally uses a small amount of keystream compared to conventional 
statistical attacks. Due to this, it is worthwhile to investigate other methods of cryptanalyzing LEX-BES or 
even LEX-AES using algebraic techniques. Furthermore, it is shown that by embedding the original LEX-
AES into LEX-BES, a system of quadratic and linear equations can be derived. Therefore, if methods for 
solving equations improve, this particular cipher may be vulnerable to algebraic attack. 
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